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This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market 
returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 
2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of 
non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different firm characteristics and risk factors. 
Family firms generate an annual abnormal return of 2.8% to 7.1%. Moreover, family firms 
potentially having more agency problems earn higher abnormal returns. Although they are more 
profitable, family firms have lower valuations and regularly surprise markets by announcing 
better-than-expected earnings. The evidence suggests that outside investors earn a premium for 
being exposed to the specific agency problems present in family firms. 
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1. Introduction 
For over a decade, the impact of family ownership and control on the performance of 
publicly listed companies received extensive attention in the academic literature. This is 
important, since family firms represent a large fraction of listed firms worldwide (Carney and 
Child (2013); Faccio and Lang (2002); La Porta et al. (1998)). Most of this literature focuses 
on performance metrics related to profitability (return-on-assets, ROA) or valuation ratios 
(Tobin’s Q) (e.g., Anderson and Reeb (2003); Villalonga and Amit (2006)). However, the 
evidence on the stock market performance of these firms is more limited, although it is of prime 
importance for the minority shareholders of these firms and investors in general. Our paper fills 
this gap by proposing a detailed analysis of the stock returns of family-owned firms compared 
to the rest of the market. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss 
market, we find that family ownership has a beneficial impact, and that these firms deliver 
higher stock market returns than non-family ones. The outperformance of the former ranges 
between 2.8% and 7.1% per annum, depending on the way risk is adjusted. 
The stock returns of family-owned firms might have received little attention so far 
possibly due to the strong belief in market efficiency. Characteristics such as ownership 
structure, and particularly the identity of the controlling shareholder, if any, is public 
information that should be integrated into stock market prices, and there is no reason to believe 
that choosing stocks based on this information might lead to superior returns. However, recent 
literature shows that strategies using public information can offer superior returns on the stock 
market. For instance, Edmans (2011) shows that a strategy based on a publicly disclosed index 
of employee satisfaction (Forbes 100 best companies to work for) leads to positive abnormal 
returns. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find that an investment in firms that have more 
organization capital produces significant risk-adjusted returns. Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi 
(2014) document that choosing stock of companies with high CEO ownership also leads to 
significant outperformance. The common explanation here is that the market does not fully 
value these features, as they are difficult to appraise quantitatively. 
The positive impact of family ownership on stock returns could also be related to an 
improperly assessed effort of family members by market participants, since the concentration 
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of ownership in family hands may both have positive and negative effects on economic 
efficiency. Family ownership can thus have various implications on the agency problems in a 
corporation and, hence, on its profitability and perception by market participants. On one hand, 
family control reduces the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (agency 
problem I), as families tend to seek the long-term sustainability for their companies and, from 
their dominant position, can closely monitor management and challenge any decision not in 
their interest. This behavior can be value creating for the company and its shareholders. More 
generally, families have strong incentives to maximize firm value and take the best possible 
decisions to maximize their own wealth. On the other hand, the presence of a large shareholder 
generates conflicts of interest between minority and majority shareholders (agency problem II). 
The controlling shareholder can use its power to extract private benefits, which reduces 
company value. For family firms, these problems are not likely to materialize as pure wealth 
expropriation, since the own wealth of family members would be negatively impacted. 
However, agency problems may take the form of non-value maximizing decisions, because the 
family is pursuing objectives that increase its own utility (e.g., firm growth, reputation, or 
survival) and do not enhance shareholder value. Moreover, these firms can suffer from specific 
problems, such as family feuds or nepotism, which would also lead to firm value reduction. 
These two opposing effects of family control vary by company and depend on the different firm 
characteristics. For instance, and Anderson and Reeb (2003) have documented a nonlinear 
relationship between firm performance and the family stake. They show there is an incentive 
effect at lower levels of control, and that performance increases with family holdings. However, 
this relation changes to an entrenchment effect with negative consequences on performance at 
higher levels of control.  
This paper investigates the stock market performance of Swiss family firms from 
January 2003 to December 2013 for a sample of 195 companies listed on the SIX Swiss 
Exchange. The Swiss market represents an ideal laboratory for studying the relationship 
between family ownership and stock returns for two reasons. First, La Porta et al. (1999) 
document that, in most markets worldwide, ownership is concentrated, frequently in the hands 
of families, with investors being relatively poorly protected by law. In this respect, Switzerland 
is a representative market, as it is characterized by the presence of numerous family firms and 
low investor protection. Compared to the US, the levels of ownership by the largest 
blockholders are higher. Anderson and Reeb (2003) document an average holding of 17.88% 
of the voting rights for families in the US, while Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) report an average 
stake of 55% for families in Switzerland. In addition to the high control levels, Switzerland 
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ranks relatively poorly in international comparisons of minority shareholder protection 
according to the studies of La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008). These Swiss market 
features facilitate the potential extraction of private benefits by the controlling shareholder. 
Second, this market has a relatively small number of listed firms. As emphasized in the 
literature,1 most commercial databases on ownership contain inaccuracies or are unable to 
identify correctly the ultimate owner of a firm. Therefore, hand collecting data on ownership 
structures from different sources overcomes this problem and allows documenting accurately 
the different aspects of ownership. This process is easier to implement with a reasonable 
number of firms, as is the case of the Swiss market. Another advantage of the limited number 
of firms is that it allows us to work with the entire population of listed firms. This contrasts 
with other markets, where the large number of listed firms forces researchers to work on 
subsamples, exposing the reported results to potential sample selection bias. 
The main results of this paper show that (1) family firms have higher stock returns than widely 
held firms and those with another blockholder; (2) considering a number of different risk 
factors, family firms outperform non-family firms in terms of risk-adjusted stock market 
returns; (3) the superior performance of family firms is associated with the level of control of 
the family; (4) although family firms are more profitable than other firms, their stocks trade at 
a discount on the market; (5) family firms have larger earnings surprises than other firms; (6) 
these earnings surprises translate into stronger market reactions to earnings announcements. 
Overall, our results show that family firms, which have more potential agency problems, have 
higher abnormal returns than other firms. This suggests that outside investors earn a premium 
for being exposed to the specific agency problems present in family firms. 
This study contributes to the existing literature as follows. First, it adds to the literature 
on the link between ownership structure and stock market returns by proposing a detailed 
investigation of the impact of founding family ownership on stock market returns, an aspect 
that hitherto received limited attention.2 Besides documenting the difference in returns between 
firms with different types of controlling shareholders, this study attempts to identify the reasons 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Anderson and Lee (1997), Dlugosz et al. (2006), or Holderness (2009). 
2 Only few studies examined the stock market performance of family firms. For example, Corstjens et al. (2006) 
analyze large firms from the French, UK, German, and US markets, and find positive abnormal returns for family 
firms on the French market. Cella (2009) considers a sample of large firms from eight European countries, and 
documents that family firms from these countries earn significant positive abnormal returns. Fahlenbrach (2009) 
examines the performance of a subsample of family firms—those run by a founder-CEO in the US—finding that 
these firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2013) find that, for a sample 
of Portuguese companies, family firms outperform others. However, this body of literature does not find 
explanations for the stock market performance of family firms. 
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explaining the outperformance of family firms. We find that abnormal performance is 
associated with the level of family control, a measure indicating the degree of control 
contestability and therefore the magnitude of potential agency problems. Our results also show 
that market participants have concerns about the effects of family presence on firm 
performance, as the shares of these firms trade at a discount. In this context, the abnormal 
returns appear to be a reward for bearing the risk associated with family control. Second, this 
study contributes to the growing finance literature on family firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is one of the first to investigate the stock market returns of such firms and to show 
that the level of family control matters. Finally, our study contributes to the emerging literature 
at the intersection of corporate finance and asset pricing, showing the existence of firm features 
not properly assessed by the market, which generate abnormal returns for investors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 exposes the specific 
agency problems affecting family firms while section 3 describes the Swiss institutional setting. 
Section 4 presents the data and variables used in the analysis and provides descriptive statistics 
for the sample. Section 5 documents the stock market performances of family firms as well as 
their relationship to levels of family control, and checks the robustness of the results, discussing, 
notably, endogeneity issues. Section 6 provides additional analyses to identify the source of the 
superior returns of family firms. Section 7 summarizes the major findings and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Founding family ownership and agency problems 
The literature has long recognized that the presence of a large controlling shareholder 
alters the classical agency problem existing between shareholders and managers (agency 
problem I). Since large shareholders have strong incentives to credibly monitor managers, they 
are likely to reduce the impact of this type of agency problem and improve the situation for all 
shareholders. However, the presence of a large shareholder generates another type of conflicts 
of interests between majority and minority shareholders (agency problem II). A large 
shareholder has the power to impose his own objectives on the firm’s management and the 
related decisions might not always be in the best interest of other shareholders. Among the 
different types of controlling shareholders, families have specific characteristics that can reduce 
or amplify the impact of agency problems.  
Families have a high degree of involvement with the ﬁrm that enhances the eﬀective 
monitoring of management. This obviously reduces agency problem I and may also provide 
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more incentives for employed managers to improve ﬁrm performance by raising revenues 
and/or lowering expenses. Furthermore, families have a long-term perspective on generating 
value because their goal is to pass the firm to succeeding generations. This has implications for 
financial decisions of family firms. Casson (1999) claims, for instance, that families will refrain 
from consuming wealth during their lifetime and therefore will reduce private benefit extraction 
and agency problem II. In this context, James (1999) suggests that family firms invest more 
efficiently than other firms. Stein (1988, 1989) shows that firms that have shareholders with a 
longer investment horizon tend to perform better than firms with a short-term focus. The 
presence of owners who exercise long-term control over the ﬁrm is also associated with the 
general beneﬁts of stable and long-term management. For instance, outside parties are more 
likely to deal with the same management and same corporate strategies for an extended period. 
This, in turn, facilitates a stronger business relationship, allowing trust to build over time. 
Typically, such improved implicit contracting is less costly than complete explicit contracting 
(Andres (2008)). Long-term relationships may allow suppliers to oﬀer better terms while 
sustained relationships with lenders may also allow ﬁrms to enjoy a lower cost of debt financing 
(Anderson et al. (2003)), which will also boost earnings and long-term prospects. Finally, 
families also enjoy non-ﬁnancial beneﬁts of control, such as the prestige of running their own 
company or having a good reputation. These benefits have been shown to be stronger 
motivators to improve ﬁrm performance than ﬁnancial rewards alone (e.g., Bennedsen et al. 
(2007)). Although the above-mentioned factors might vary from firm to firm, it appears that 
families have strong economic incentives to maximize firm performance and their presence 
should therefore be associated with less of agency problem I than in other firms. 
The presence of a family as a large shareholder can also generate conflicts of interest 
between minority and majority shareholders (agency problem II). A family could use its power 
to extract private benefits and expropriate outside shareholders, which will reduce company 
value. However, since the family has a close link to the firm, these problems are not likely to 
materialize as pure wealth expropriation, which would negatively impact the wealth of family 
members. Agency problem II can arise in different ways in family firms. They can suffer from 
very specific problems such as family feuds. When family members are not all involved or 
interested in the management of the firm, or if they have diverging views, it might lead to 
disagreements and fights that will have a detrimental impact on firm value. Family organization 
and structure might therefore have a significant impact on firm value. However, this is usually 
not apparent to outside investors because these details are not disclosed and publicly available. 
It is therefore difficult to assess how they impact firm value. Nepotism is another family-
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specific problem. It means that the family insists that some of the firm’s managers are chosen 
among family members and not from professional managers outside the family. These 
managers might not have the necessary skills to run the firm and this could lead to value 
destruction (e.g., Bennedsen et al. (2007)). A related problem occurs when family members 
remain active in management although they are no longer competent or qualified to run the 
company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) estimate that this problem is the greatest cost associated 
with the presence of a controlling shareholder. More generally, as discussed by Fama and 
Jensen (1985), controlling shareholders can obtain greater benefits by pursuing their own 
objectives rather than shareholder value maximization. In the case of family firms, these 
objectives can be firm growth, reputation, or survival. Families frequently have the absolute 
control of their firm by holding a large fraction of voting rights. This implies that different 
classical corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective, since family power often cannot be 
challenged. Typically, a family has the last word for all the decisions taken during the annual 
general meeting. Family firms will also be insulated from the market for corporate control and 
market pressures in general. Outside investors are therefore exposed to family decisions, 
whether they are good or bad for firm value.  
In summary, the presence of a family as a controlling shareholder can simultaneously 
reduce or magnify agency problems. It is, however, difficult for outside investors to properly 
assess the impact of family presence on firm value since family organization, structure, and 
internal relations are opaque and might change over time. 
 
3. Swiss institutional setting 
The Swiss stock market is one of the largest stock markets worldwide. At the end of 
2015, it ranked 10th in terms of market capitalization (World Federation of Exchanges (2016)). 
Despite its size, the number of publicly listed firms is relatively small, as only 250 companies 
are traded on this market. The ownership structure of Swiss firms is typical for continental 
Europe as the majority have a concentrated ownership. For instance, Faccio and Lang (2002) 
report that, in 1995, 28% of companies were widely held, while 48% of firms are family-owned 
and 24% have a non-family blockholder. Moreover, they report that controlling shareholders 
essentially employ dual-class shares to increase their control over the company, as these are 
unrestricted by Swiss law. The authors report that 51% of firms use multiple share classes, 
while 10% resort to pyramidal structures and none to cross-holdings.  
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In terms of corporate governance characteristics, Switzerland belongs to the German-
origin civil law countries according to La Porta et al. (1998), which tend to have poor investor 
protection. This is illustrated by Switzerland ranking poorly both in terms of anti-director rights 
index (La Porta et al. (1998)) and the anti-self-dealing index proposed by Djankov et al. (2008). 
It also has a nearly non-existent but slowly evolving market for corporate control (Lowinski et 
al. (2004)). These observations indicate that, on this market, controlling shareholders such as 
families have significant freedom. As such, agency problems between majority and minority 
shareholders can potentially be more severe, since controlling shareholders can extract private 
benefits more easily than in other countries. However, improvements in investor protection 
have been recently observed. In 2002, Switzerland adopted a code of best practices for corporate 
governance. This led to significant changes in corporate governance practices. An example is 
the fact that numerous firms abandoned their dual-class share structure since. Finally, in 2013, 
the Swiss citizens voted a very constraining law to limit abuses on executive compensation.  
A recent example3 illustrates how agency problems related to family ownership can 
materialize for minority shareholders in this setting. Sika AG is a medium-sized company in 
the chemical specialties sector. The company was founded in 1910 by K. Winkler. He was then 
joined by his son-in-law, F. Schenker, and both developed the company over the years. The 
descendants of the two founders, the Schenker-Winkler family, then controlled the firm through 
the SWH holding company. With the use of dual-class shares, they held 16% of capital and 
52% of voting rights. In December 2014, the SWH holding announced its intention to sell its 
complete stake to the French company Saint-Gobain, as the group of descendants had diverging 
interests and were not willing to keep the company anymore. The price Saint-Gobain agreed to 
pay to SWH holding for their shares included a premium of 80% over the current market price. 
Other minority shareholders could not benefit from this offer and were at risk with this change 
of control, as there were no guarantees for the future of Sika since Saint-Gobain is its direct 
competitor in many sectors. Following this announcement, the stock price dropped by more 
than 20%, directly affecting the wealth of minority shareholders. Sika’s example highlights the 
potential dangers for the shareholders of family firms in Switzerland, a country where investor 




                                                          
3 The information about this case has been obtained from several articles published in the Swiss financial press. 
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4. Data and variables 
The empirical analysis is performed on a dataset of 195 companies listed on the SIX 
Swiss Exchange from January 2003 to December 2013. The final sample contains 19,604 firm-
month observations on the entire population of Swiss non-financial listed firms over the 
analyzed period. Different sources are used to build this database as follows. 
Ownership data are collected by hand, and include information on all non-financial 
companies belonging to the Swiss Performance Index (SPI), that is, detailed information on the 
ownership structure of the firms.4 Particularly, we have information on the identity of all the 
large shareholders holding more than 3% of voting rights in every company (if any). When the 
shareholder is a company, we further search for the ultimate owner as to determine the exact 
type of shareholder (e.g., the Schenker-Winkler family behind the SWH holding company). We 
also identify the proportions of voting and cash-flow rights held by each large shareholder. 
Ownership data are observed on a yearly basis and recorded at the end of each year.  
Data are collected from the annual reports of companies, as well as from Swiss stock 
guides, newspaper articles, firm homepages, or the commercial register when needed. We 
follow the standard practice in the literature, and when the largest shareholder has a stake of the 
voting rights larger than the 20% threshold, we consider the firm is controlled by a majority 
shareholder (Faccio and Lang (2002)). We classify the companies by type of owner as follows: 
family, widely held and firms controlled by another blockholder. The latter include firms 
controlled by the state, private investor,5 owned by another widely held corporation, owned by 
another widely held financial firms, and miscellaneous. For each largest shareholder of a firm, 
we compute the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights as the ratio between the proportions 
of voting and cash-flow rights held by this shareholder. In Switzerland, this difference is mainly 
due to the use of dual-class shares. When a company does not have a shareholder holding more 
than 20% of the voting rights, we classify it as a widely held firm. For these firms, we also 
compute the wedge for the largest shareholder even if he holds less than 20% of voting rights. 
                                                          
4 The database of ownership structure for 2003–2010 originates from the work of Isakov and Weisskopf (2014). 
We have extended their database for 2011–2013 and collected additional information. 
5 We follow Andres (2008) and Isakov and Weisskopf (2014), establishing a specific category of controlling 
shareholder named private investor. A private investor is defined as one or more individuals that have neither 
founded the company nor shaped it in a substantial way over time. The motivations and values of a private investor 
strongly differ from those of a founding family. Typically, there are private investors who target making a quick 
profit and then leaving. Private investors also differ from other non-family blockholders in being more likely to 
reduce agency problems I (more incentives to control managers), but are more prone to agency problem II (more 
incentives to extract private benefits). Typically, firms with this type of controlling shareholder are considered 
family firms in a large proportion of the literature, which might lead to biased results. 
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Market data on the monthly stock returns of each company are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters’ Datastream. Returns are computed as total returns and include the dividend 
distribution. Besides returns, we also need a series of variables to quantify the different firm 
characteristics, as well as the earnings announcements, for the empirical analyses. These are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream, Worldscope, and FactSet. A detailed description 
of the different variables and their sources is found in the Appendix. 
Table 1 presents the sample composition according to different types of controlling 
shareholders. These statistics are provided for the entire sample period (column 1). We also 
compute them for the first (column 2), middle (column 3), and last year (column 4) of our 
sample to document the evolution of ownership over time. We also present the mean, 
maximum, and minimum number of firms in each category and year.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Our sample appears well balanced regarding firm types. We have three main groups of 
roughly equal sizes. Each year, we have approximately 50 firms in each category (widely held, 
family, and firms with another blockholder). Widely held firms represent 33% of the sample. 
Family firms are the most common type, representing approximately 35% of the sample. 
Finally, 32% of our sample consists of firms with a controlling shareholder other than the 
founding family. In this group, 5% of firms are owned by the state, 15% by a private investor, 
5% by another widely held corporation, 4% by another widely held financial firm, and 3% are 
miscellaneous. Proportions remain almost constant between the three decomposed periods. The 
ownership pattern is stable over time, as there are few changes in the controlling shareholders’ 
identity or the fraction of voting rights they hold. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for stock returns and the different variables 
that are used in the analysis. It contains information on the entire sample (column 1), as well as 
for the different categories of firms, grouped by the type of controlling shareholder, namely 
family firms (column 2), non-family firms (column 3), the latter being further subdivided in 
widely held firms (column 4) and firms held by another blockholder (column 5). Table 2 also 
presents (i) the means of the different variables used in the analysis and (ii) the results of the 
tests of difference in means between family firms and other controlling shareholder types. For 
stock returns, we also provide results and tests on median returns.6 
                                                          
6 Some variables are observed on a monthly frequency while some others only have annual observation (e.g., 
ownership or accounting variables). We merge the monthly data with the corresponding current yearly data by 
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 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The average monthly raw stock return for the entire sample is 0.59% per month. Family 
firms have significantly higher average raw returns (0.91%) than other firm categories. Widely 
held firms have the lowest average raw return over the analyzed period (0.25%). Qualitatively 
similar results are obtained for median returns. Moreover, family firms appear to be 
significantly more profitable than other firms according to their mean ROA (6.10%). In terms 
of risk, family firms are slightly less risky than other firms in the sample. They also have lower 
betas (except for the firms with another blockholder that have a slightly lower mean beta of 
0.87) and lower volatility. In terms of control-enhancing mechanisms, family firms have an 
average wedge of 1.57, while this value is close to one for all other categories. This means that 
the largest shareholder in family firms has, on average, 1.5 more voting than cash-flow rights, 
while the other groups respect the one-vote-one-share principle. Despite the progressive 
reduction of dual-class shares structures in Switzerland, family firms still use this technique to 
reinforce the control they have over the firm. Interestingly, the mean wedge for widely held 
firms is slightly below one. This is due to some firms having limitations on voting rights and 
some large shareholders having less voting than cash-flow rights. Concerning the other firm 
characteristics, family firms and firms held by another blockholder have higher book-to-market 
ratios and less liquid stocks (higher Amihud’s illiquidity ratio) and are generally smaller than 
widely held firms (in terms of market value, total assets, or net sales). While firms held by 
another blockholder are the oldest, widely held firms are, on average, the youngest. We also 
observe that family firms are more generous with their shareholders, as they pay significantly 
more dividends than other firms (they have an average payout ratio of 1.92%, while other firms 
have 1.42%). This is consistent with the findings of Isakov and Weisskopf (2015), who 
document that family firms have higher payouts in Switzerland. Regarding leverage, family 
firms have slightly lower levels of leverage, on average, than non-family firms. These results 
are consistent with the previous literature.7 
 
 
                                                          
repeating the values of the annual variables for the 12 monthly observations of the same year. As ownership 
variables are relatively stable over time and changes are disclosed before the end of the year, we do not use lagged 
variables. 
7 Schmid (2013) shows that leverage is lower for family firms in Germany, which has an institutional and economic 
environment similar to the Swiss one.  
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5. Stock market returns of founding family firms 
This section analyzes the stock market performance of family firms. We use two 
complementary approaches: firm-characteristics and portfolio-based. We use the former as our 
primary analysis tool because it allows for a larger number of risk factors/firm characteristics 
that impact stock returns than the standard portfolio approach, which is based on size, book-to-
market, and momentum factors. Moreover, since the portfolio-based approach has some 
drawbacks in the case of Switzerland, we use it as a secondary test to check if the initial results 
hold. 
 
5.1 Firm-characteristics approach 
Our main tool to study the impact of family ownership on stock performance is a firm-
characteristics approach. We follow Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) and use two methods to 
estimate the following multivariate regression: 
 = + + +it i i it i it itr a b X c eZ , (1) 
where rit is the total returns for firm i in month t, Xit the dummy variable indicating the presence 
of one type of shareholder in the ownership structure, and Zit a vector of firm characteristics. 
The first method is a pooled panel regression (POLS2C), where standard errors are two-
dimensionally clustered along the firm and time dimensions. The second method is a Fama-
MacBeth (Fama and MacBeth (1973)) approach (FMB), where cross-sectional regressions are 
run separately for each month of the sample period, and then the values of the final parameters 
are determined using the mean and statistical significance of the time-series statistics of these 
monthly estimates.8 In both cases, we also control for industry effects by including industry 
dummies in all regressions, based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 10 industry 
classification. Following Brennan et al. (1998), Gompers et al. (2003), and Lilienfeld-Toal and 
Ruenzi (2014), our set of control variables includes the logs of book-to-market and of market 
value as proxies for the size and value effect, respectively. We also use the price of stocks and 
volatility of returns, as well as three variables for returns 3–2, 6–4, and 12–7 months before the 
month of analysis as proxies for the momentum factor. As suggested by Edmans (2011), we 
further control for stock liquidity by using the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)). We 
also consider the dividend yield and leverage and, as proxies for firm’s efficiency, the operating 
                                                          
8 Two-dimensional clustering provides asymptotically unbiased standard errors, while the FMB estimates of 
standard errors can be biased in the presence of firm fixed effects. It is therefore recommended to use the two 
methods, since we cannot rule out the presence of firm fixed effects in our regressions. 
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margin and sales over total assets. Finally, we use asset and sales growth over the past year and 
over the past five years. All variables are detailed in the Appendix. 
The results of the multivariate regressions with firm characteristics are shown in Table 
3. Among the different control variables, we observe that some characteristics that are not 
included in traditional empirical asset pricing models are significantly related to individual 
stock returns. These variables are Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, dividend yield, leverage, operating 
margin, sales, and asset growth. This indicates that the firm-characteristics approach is relevant 
to analyzing stocks in Switzerland. We first estimate in columns (1) and (2) the model by using 
a family dummy which means that the control group is made of all non-family firms. The main 
results are the significant coefficients obtained in both approaches for the family dummy. These 
results reflect that family firms earn significantly higher returns compared to other firms in our 
sample, and that these differences cannot be explained by differences in firm characteristics. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Firms with a family holding at least 20% of the voting rights earn a significant additional 
monthly return of 0.52% (6.42% annually) compared to firms with no family holding in the 
POLS2C regression. The coefficients differ slightly between the regression approaches, but 
both are statistically significant. In a second stage, we also include another blockholder dummy 
to check if firms with another blockholder as controlling shareholder behave differently from 
widely held firms and should be considered separately in the analysis (columns (3) and (4)). 
We observe that the additional dummy is not significant and that other “blockholders” firms 
can be included in the control group with widely held firms. We also perform an F-test of 
equality of the coefficient between the family and other blockholders dummies for the POLS2C 
approach and reject the null. All these results also confirm the univariate results of Table 2 (i.e., 
family firms have the highest returns). 
 
5.2 Portfolio-based approach  
We also use the portfolio-based approach to analyze the impact of family ownership on 
stock returns. We follow the methodology of Gompers et al. (2003), which is based on grouping 
stocks with similar characteristics in portfolios. At the beginning of each year, we build equally 
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weighted portfolios,9 containing the stocks of all firms with the same type of controlling 
shareholder (family and non-family firms). Portfolio returns are subsequently calculated at the 
end of each month over the entire year. At the beginning of the next year, portfolios are 
reformed and returns calculated again. We then create a self-financing strategy that is long on 
the portfolio of family firms and short on the portfolio of non-family firms. 
We then use a multi-factor model to analyze the performance of the different portfolios. 
Specifically, we use the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), which is an extension of the 
classical Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French (1992, 1993)), with an additional 
factor reflecting the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). We estimate the model 
as: 
 1 2 3 4α β β β β= + + + + +pt p p t p t p t p t ptR RMRF SMB HML WML e , (2) 
where Rpt is the return of portfolio p minus the risk-free rate in month t, RMRFt the expected 
market return minus the risk-free rate in month t, SMBt the difference between the expected 
return in month t of a portfolio of small-cap stocks and that of a portfolio of large cap stocks, 
HMLt the difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio of stocks with high 
book-to-market and that of a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market, and WMLt the 
difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio with stocks having 
outperformed the previous month and that of a portfolio with stocks having underperformed the 
previous month. Alpha measures the abnormal return an investor would have obtained monthly 
from 2003 to 2013. This model necessitates monthly estimates of the four relevant factors, as 
well as the risk-free rate for Switzerland. We use local factors, as Griffin (2002) concludes that 
domestic factors explain better time-series variations in returns than world factor models and 
generally have smaller pricing errors than their international counterparts. The returns of these 
factors have been computed by Ammann and Steiner (2008) for 1990–2014.10 However, 
evidence on the validity of the four-factor model for the Swiss stock market is weak (e.g., Fama 
and French (1998) and Ammann and Steiner (2008)). Moreover, the reliability of these factors 
is not guaranteed, as the number of stocks available for their construction is limited. We 
therefore also use a simple one-factor model as an alternative to measuring abnormal returns. 
                                                          
9 The use of equally weighted portfolios is more appropriate for the Swiss market, since some firms are very large 
and represent an important fraction of total market capitalization. The use of value-weighted portfolios is less 
informative, since these portfolios would essentially reflect the returns of these few large firms. 
10 These factors are available on Amman’s website (www.manuel-ammann.com). We thank the authors for making 
these factors available to other researchers. 
15 
 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. The first two columns report 
abnormal returns and the risk coefficients for the portfolios representing the two types of firms, 
while the last column report the coefficient of the self-financing strategy long in family firms 
and short in non-family firms. 
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Panel A shows the results for the four-factor model. The abnormal returns of the 
portfolio of family firms is positive and insignificant, while the abnormal returns of non-family 
firms is negative and insignificant. The returns on the self-financing strategy long on family 
firms and short on non-family firms yield significant and positive alphas of 0.25% (3.04% per 
annum). However, the results must be interpreted with caution, as explained above. We 
therefore use a single-factor model as well, whose results are shown in Panel B. We find the 
alphas of both long-only strategies are higher than in the four-factor model. This time, the 
portfolio of family firms displays a positive and significant alpha of 0.57% per month (7.05% 
per annum), while the portfolios of non-family firms is positive and insignificant. Regarding 
the self-financed strategy, it yields an insignificant abnormal return of 0.34% per month (2.30% 
per annum). As robustness check, we repeat the analysis with value-weighted portfolios to 
verify if the results are not driven by smaller firms, and find qualitatively similar results.11 
Generally, this complementary analysis shows that an investment in a portfolio of family firms 
yields higher risk-adjusted returns than non-family firms. The results appear to be qualitatively 
similar but slightly weaker than those obtained in the firm-characteristics approach. This might 
be explained by the fact that some individual returns are diluted in the portfolio approach.  
 
5.3 Longevity of outperformance 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 might be due to market mispricing for the effect of family 
ownership. However, since ownership is stable over time, an efficient market should correct its 
error and abnormal returns should decline over time, as the market learns the true value of these 
firms. We therefore study the longevity of outperformance. We follow Edmans (2011) and 
assess it with a long-term event study approach, computing cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). The “event” is the end-of-year disclosure of firm ownership structure. Each year, we 
calculate for each firm and each month an abnormal monthly return by subtracting the market 
                                                          
11 The results are not shown due to space considerations, but are available upon request.  
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return from the raw stock return. Starting in January, we cumulate these benchmark-adjusted 
returns over horizons of x months (12, 24, 36, 48, or 60). We then create equally-weighted 
portfolios, containing stocks of firms with similar ownership. Table 5 presents the average 
CARs over different horizons for different portfolios, obtained by computing the portfolio 
average returns over different years in the sample. Table 5 shows the results for the portfolio 
constructed from the entire sample of firms, as well as subsamples of firms with similar types 
of controlling shareholders, and also the differences in mean returns between portfolios. 
 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
These results first show that the CARs for the entire population of non-financial Swiss 
firms are mostly not statistically different from zero for the five horizons in column (1). 
However, when distinguishing between family and non-family firms, we observe an important 
difference as, for each period, the CARs for the groups of family firms are positive and 
statistically different from zero, whereas those of non-family firms are negative and statistically 
different from zero. Second, the differences in means tests confirm the outperformance of 
family firms over time compared to non-family. Finally, CARs are continuously growing for 
all groups (positively for the family firms and negatively for non-family firms), suggesting the 
market is not eliminating mispricing over the long term. We thus conclude there is persistence 
in the outperformance of family firms and that mispricing is never fully corrected. This could 
be due to the presence of a premium for holding stocks of family firms.  
 
5.4 Level of family control and stock returns 
In this section, we investigate if there is a relationship between the level of family 
control, measured by the proportion of voting rights held by the family, and stock returns. 
However, as pointed out by Gompers et al. (2010), the analysis of the effect of the level of 
control is challenging as one variable is used to identify two separate forces: incentive and 
entrenchment. The impact of this variable can be interpreted in two opposite ways. A high stake 
in the firm by a large shareholder may be an indication of the possible presence of agency 
problems II that could be detrimental for small shareholders. On the other side a high stake held 
by the family might be a sign that family members will not undertake value-destroying actions 
since this would harm their own interests and wealth. In this case the higher stake would reflect 
an incentive effect that is beneficial to all shareholders. The literature has investigated the 
relationship between firm performance and the stake of the largest shareholder: Morck et al. 
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(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Isakov and Weisskopf 
(2014) find a nonlinear (concave) relationship between ownership and accounting performance. 
They also find that performance first increases as family ownership increases (incentive effect) 
but, after a certain level of ownership, performance decreases (entrenchment effect). The 
explanation for this concave relationship is that agency problems (risk of expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder) become high when the controlling 
shareholder has a high stake. This phenomenon has been documented for profitability and 
valuation ratios, but not for stock returns.  
To investigate the relationship between returns and control levels, we first compute the 
different descriptive statistics of family firms by distinguishing three sub-groups according to 
the level of voting rights a family has in the firm. The first group contains firms where families 
have 20–50% voting rights, a moderate level of control that does not allow full control over the 
firm. If a family holds more than 50% of voting rights, it has the absolute majority, thus making 
most standard corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., annual meeting votes or takeover threat) 
ineffective. We split the firms with family stakes above 50% into two groups to determine 
whether firms with very high levels of control have a different impact on returns: 50–80% and 
80–100% of voting rights.12 Pagano and Röell (1998) and La Porta et al. (1999) discuss the 
importance of having other large shareholders in a firm with a large controlling shareholder. 
They claim that these other large shareholders have the resources and incentives to monitor the 
largest shareholder, and that they can challenge the controlling shareholder and moderate the 
level of agency problem II even though the largest shareholder has more than 50% of voting 
rights. We therefore first investigate the presence of other large shareholders in family firms in 
Table 6. We consider the full ownership structure of family firms and report all other large 
shareholders that have at least 3% of voting rights.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
We observe that families hold on average 49.9% of the voting rights and that the second 
largest shareholder has 9.6% of the voting rights. There are on average 1.48 other shareholders 
owning more than 3% of the voting rights per firm besides the family, and together these hold 
15.4% of the voting rights. In 16.7% of cases, the families face atomistic shareholders, as there 
                                                          
12 Note that high levels of control do not automatically imply low stock liquidity, since these firms frequently use 
control enhancing mechanisms and families might have much lower cash-flow than voting rights. 
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is no shareholder with more than 3% of voting rights. Table 6 shows that the number and size 
of large shareholders is inversely related to the family control levels and that the number of 
firms without any other large shareholders is positively related to the stake of the family. We 
observe that there are more large shareholders with larger stakes in the range of 50-80% than 
in firms where the family has a stake of 80-100%. Those large shareholders may monitor the 
actions of the family and eventually challenge them, therefore potentially reducing the impact 
of agency problems in those firms although the family has total control of the firm. Since the 
family is almost always the only large shareholder of the firm when the family holds 80-100% 
of the voting rights, it is important to distinguish firms with a stake of 50-80% from those with 
a stake of 80-100%. In the latter case, families have virtually no counterpower and there is more 
room for agency problems to materialize.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
In Table 7, we provide descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
according to the different levels of family involvement. We first observe that the mean returns 
increase monotonically with the stake of the family. For families having a stake between 80 and 
100%, the mean monthly return is 1.01%, while for those holding a stake of 20–50%, it is 
0.88%. The median returns show a different picture since they decrease with the stake held by 
the family. However, as the differences between mean and median returns are not significant, 
there does not seem to be a relation between the stake of the family and returns at this stage. 
Table 7 shows important differences between the different groups of family firms. The group 
of firms with high family control tends to include older and smaller firms, and firms with higher 
liquidity, lower leverage, and higher book-to-market ratios. To further investigate if there is a 
difference in the returns of firms with different levels of family control, it is important to take 
into account the differences documented in Panel B of Table 7. We therefore investigate the 
relationship between family stakes and returns by estimating firm-characteristics regressions 
(equation (1)). The results are presented in Table 8.13 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
                                                          
13 To save space, we do not present the control variables coefficients for the results of firm-characteristics 
regressions. These are available upon request.  
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We first regress the returns on the percentage of control rights of the family, and obtain 
a positive and significant coefficient that indicates a strong monotonic positive relationship 
between stock returns and the family stake. In column (3) and (4), we next analyze the role of 
other blockholders by adding the percentage of control rights held by other blockholders in 
order to check if other blockholder should be distinguished from widely held firms when 
considering the level of control. The results are similar to those obtained in Table 3 as we report 
insignificant coefficients for other blockholders. We also reject the null of equality between 
coefficients between family firms and firms controlled by another blockholder. We can 
therefore safely consider non-family firms as a homogeneous group. Since the literature shows 
a concave relationship between performance and control levels, we add the squared stake to the 
equation. The results are reported in columns (5) and (6) and we obtain insignificant coefficients 
for the squared term, which means that the relation is linear and not concave and that there is 
no negative impact of high level of control on returns. This is confirmed by the fourth group of 
results in columns (7) and (8), where we split the family dummy variable in three, according to 
the level of family ownership. We find the dummy is not significant for the 20–50% stake, but 
it is for the two other stake ranges. Moreover, the coefficients are the largest for the group of 
firms with high family stakes. The outperformance of this type of firms is 0.91% per month (or 
11.48% per annum) for the pooled regression results. This means that, among the group of 
family firms, those with high family control earn the highest returns. This contrasts the results 
in the literature on valuation and profitability ratios, where performance decreases at high levels 
of control. This can be interpreted as a reward for holding stocks with a high level of family 
control. Since these high control levels imply the inefficiency of most standard shareholder 
protection mechanisms and the absence of other large shareholders, it is likely that agency 
problems are more likely to materialize in these firms and that investors want to be compensated 
for this risk.  
 
5.5 Robustness tests 
5.5.1. Endogeneity problems  
The empirical results obtained in the previous section potentially suffer from two 
important problems: reverse causality and omitted variable bias. We discuss and try to assess 
the impact of these problems on our results in this section.  
In the current analysis, we assume that family ownership causes higher stock market 
returns. It could, however, be argued that the causality is reversed and that families will tend to 
only keep control of firms that will produce higher stock returns in the future. This reverse 
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causality argument is based on the fact that families have a large fraction of their wealth 
invested in the firm and that they frequently have access to the executive management 
(sometimes family members belong to the executive management). For this reason, families 
have an information advantage over other shareholders. They might therefore be able to assess 
the future evolution of the firm’s performance with a certain confidence and would therefore 
only keep control of firms with good prospects (and higher returns) and sell (or reduce their 
holdings in) the stocks of firms with negative outlooks. While it might be true that families have 
some superior information about the firm’s future performance, different observations from our 
sample as well as several results obtained in the previous literature are inconsistent with the 
argument that stock market returns cause family control or the level of family holdings. In our 
sample, we observe very few changes in the holdings of families over the whole period. We 
have computed 514 year-to-year differences in family stakes and find 250 cases with no 
changes, while the mean (median) variation is -0.3% (0.0%) per year. Moreover, only nine firms 
switched from a founding family status to another type of ownership structure over our sample 
period. Seven firms became controlled by another type of large shareholder, which indicates 
that this new shareholder had positive expectations about the firm's future. The remaining firms 
became widely held firms because the family wanted to diversify its wealth but nevertheless 
remained invested in the firm. If family firms were adapting their holdings to future stock 
returns, we should observe more variation in family stakes and more firms switching their 
ownership structure, since our sample period is characterized by all kinds of market conditions 
and notably a sharp stock market decline of more than 45% over the period of the financial 
crisis in 2007-2009. Moreover, if family holdings are sensitive to variations in future stock 
returns, it is difficult to explain why the average age of family firms in our sample is 69.8 years. 
Over such a long period of time, there were certainly many periods of market downturns that 
should have induced families to leave the firm if the reverse causality argument were correct. 
This absence of apparent relationship between changes in family ownership and stock returns 
in our sample can be explained by different factors. First, the informational advantage of 
families is likely to be present for future firm profitability but not for stock returns (or abnormal 
returns). This is due to the fact that stock returns are more difficult to predict because they are 
not under the control of firm’s management and they are the outcome of stock market 
participants’ actions and expectations. Second, even if families were able to predict future stock 
returns, it is not certain that they would change their holdings with respect to this parameter, 
since their primary goal is not to maximize stock returns but to preserve the firm over the long-
term and pass it to the next generation (see, for instance, Bertrand and Schoar (2006)). 
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Moreover, since families frequently use dual-class shares to control firms, they have less cash-
flow rights than voting rights and are therefore less concerned by the evolution of the firm’s 
stock price. Third, the main reasons for families to exit the firm are related to family structure 
and not to the evolution of stock prices. Bennedsen and Fan (2014), for instance, claim that the 
most common reasons for exit by the family are the growth of the family and the increasing 
ratio of uninvolved to involved family members. 
Some authors have also addressed the issue of reverse causality by using an instrumental 
variable technique to correct for the potential endogeneity bias. Anderson and Reeb (2003) have 
used this approach in their study of the relationship between family ownership and 
profitability/firm value. They find that endogeneity is not an issue, as their estimates with the 
instrumental variables approach are qualitatively similar to their original results. The same 
conclusion is reached by Fahlenbrach (2009) in his study of the impact on firm value and stock 
returns of having a founder-CEO. Although an instrumental variable approach is theoretically 
the best remedy against an endogeneity bias, it is also well-known that finding a good 
instrument is very difficult and that the use of a weak instrument is likely to bias the 
instrumental variable towards the OLS estimate (Angrist and Krueger (2001)). Since the 
literature has not identified a good instrument for family ownership so far, this approach cannot 
completely remove concerns about endogeneity.14 We nevertheless think that our series of 
factual arguments combined with the results of the previous literature using instrumental 
variables are sufficient to rule out the fact that reverse causality is a concern for our analysis. 
In addition to reverse causality, our results could suffer from an omitted variable bias as 
the relationship between stock returns and family firms could possibly be driven by other firm 
characteristics that have not been included in the model. However, since our main results are 
obtained from a firm-characteristics approach that includes a broad array of control variables, 
it reduces concerns that they are driven by an omitted variable bias (see Gompers et al. (2003) 
for a discussion). Nevertheless, since the observations of our sample are not the outcome of an 
experiment with a random assignment of firms, our results could be due to some unobservable 
factor. We therefore complement our analysis by re-estimating our model on different samples 
of matched firms to eliminate the impact of unobserved variables. We follow Anderson et al. 
(2017) and construct two matched samples using coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 
                                                          
14 We have nevertheless estimated the model by using two different instruments previously used in the literature 
(see Jiraporn et al. (2014) and Eugster (2018)): (i) the level of the family stake the first year it appears in the sample 
and (ii) the industry level of family ownership. The coefficient of the instrumented family stake is positive and 
significant (in unreported results available from the authors upon request). This gives some more support to the 
argument of absence of reverse causality although the validity of these instruments can be challenged.  
22 
 
(2009)). We match family firms to non-family firms using the following criteria: the exact 1-
digit ICB industry code, total assets, and firm age. The first sample allows the use of different 
numbers of treated and control firms in order to maximize information (m-to-n match). This 
technique computes weights that are used in the subsequent regressions. The second matching 
technique imposes the use of the same number of treated and control firms by randomly 
dropping observations (k-to-k match). The results are presented in Table 9. We observe that the 
coefficient of the family control rights variable is positive and significant in all regressions, 
which removes some additional concerns about a potential omitted variable bias.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Overall, the above results and discussions show that we can be reasonably confident in the 
causal interpretation of the impact of family ownership on stock returns. 
 
5.5.2. Adjusting stock returns for industry effects  
The literature on family firms has documented that these firms tend to congregate into 
specific industries and that this could have an impact on our results. Although our results 
include an industry dummy variable to account for this phenomenon, we repeat the analysis by 
adjusting for the return of the industry.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
We re-estimate equation (1) by subtracting the returns to industry from raw stock 
returns. Industry returns are either computed as the mean returns of stocks belonging to the 
same industry (Panel A) or the median returns of the stocks from the same industry (Panel B). 
Firms are allocated to industries according to their 1-digit ICB codes. The results of industry-
adjusted returns are unchanged as the family control rights variable is positive and significant 
in both types of industry adjustment. 
  
5.5.3. Sample composition issues 
As our sample contains a variable number of firms each year, our results might be 
affected by the fact that some poorly performing firms leave the sample because of merger or 
bankruptcy and that some well-performing firms enter the sample. If this happens, our results 
could display artificially positive results for family firms. We investigate this issue by 
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estimating equation (1) on a sample of firms that were continually listed since 2003 (the starting 
date of our sample). 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
The results are presented in Table 11. We observe that the results remain qualitatively 
similar and stronger than in our initial case. We can conclude that the performance bias is not 
driving our results.  
 
6. Source of superior returns for family firms 
Our results show that family firms generate positive abnormal returns and that these 
abnormal returns are larger for family firms with a high level of control. A longevity analysis 
concludes that these returns persist over time, which indicates that this result cannot be 
considered as an anomaly as it does not disappear over time once market participants have 
observed these high returns. These results are more in line with the idea that investors earn a 
premium for holding stock of family firms, but they raise the question of the origin of the 
premium. One explanation could lie in the fact that families have strong incentives to maximize 
firm performance beyond market expectations and that this outperformance is rewarded by the 
market. This kind of explanation has been recently put forward in the literature relating firm 
ownership to stock returns. Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) find positive abnormal returns 
for firms with high managerial ownership while Fahlenbrach (2009) documents positive 
abnormal returns for founder-CEO firms. Both studies infer that these positive returns can be 
explained by the fact that managers with high ownership or founder-CEO have very strong 
incentives to deliver abnormal performance, which in turn produces higher stock returns. In 
order to investigate whether this explanation also holds in our case, we first analyze the impact 
of family ownership on the operational performance of the firm. In a second stage, we 
investigate how market participants assess the future performance of those firms and how 
investors react to their earnings announcement. 
 
6.1 Profitability and valuation of family firms 
In order to address explicitly the question of the impact of the presence of family firms 
on performance, we examine two standard performance measures: ROA and Tobin’s Q. We 
estimate a regression similar to equation (2) but we replace the dependent variable by a 
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performance measure (either ROA or Tobin’s Q) and use annual instead of monthly data. The 
set of control variables we use is similar to Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) and includes the 
wedge, firm size, firm age, leverage, sales growth, beta, and investment intensity. The results 
are presented in Table 12.  
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
Columns (1)-(3) display regression results with profitability as a dependent variable 
(ROA). We observe that family firms are significantly more profitable than other firms and that 
this profitability is related to the level of family control. Profitability is the highest for firms 
with a family stake between 80% and 100%. This result confirms that family firms with 
economic control have high incentives to perform well and they are able to do it by producing 
high profitability. This tends to lend credence to the explanation that family control has positive 
effects on firm profitability. In columns (4)-(6), we examine the relationship to firm valuation 
(Tobin’s Q). This measure includes the market perception of the future evolution of the firm. 
Here we observe that family ownership is negatively related to valuation. More specifically we 
observe that valuation level is negatively related to the level of family control and particularly 
at high levels of control. In unreported regressions, we have also estimated the same relationship 
but assumed a quadratic relation between performance and family ownership. We find that the 
quadratic term is insignificant and that the relationship can be considered as linear. At first 
sight, these results seem to be inconsistent since a higher profitability should translate into 
higher valuation. However, when interpreting these results, it should be remembered that ROA 
is a backward-looking (historical) measure while Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking measure. 
These results mean that the market values family firms less despite their higher profitability. In 
order to reconcile the results of these two performance measures, we run another series of 
regressions with Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable and include ROA as a control variable. The 
results are presented in columns (7)-(9). ROA has a positive and significant coefficient, which 
indicates that higher profitability translates into a higher valuation as expected. However, 
family firms have a significant discount that is related to their level of control. This means that 
the superior performance of family firms is reflected into valuation (as for any other firms) but, 
at the same time, that the market discounts family ownership. Moreover, as this discount is 
positively associated with the family stake, it means that the market is less confident about the 
prospects of firms with higher levels of family control. Since these firms have less room for 
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other large shareholders to monitor family actions, we infer that this discount is related to the 
increased probability of having agency problems materializing in those firms.  
 
6.2 Analysts’ surprises, earnings announcements, and abnormal returns 
Since the market discounts the value of family firms despite their strong performance, 
a possible explanation for their stock market outperformance over our sample period could be 
that investors are overly pessimistic and overestimate the magnitude of agency problems in 
those firms. This could in turn lead to positive surprises when firms disclose their economic 
performance, which could then generate abnormal returns as investors readjust their 
expectations. To shed light on this explanation, we analyze whether market participants are 
surprised by the disclosure of the economic performance of family firms, and, in particular, at 
the time they announce their annual earnings. We also analyze how stock prices react around 
this specific date and if the surprises and market reactions are related to the level of family 
control to see if agency problems are part of the explanation  
As suggested by Core et al. (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011), one way to verify if 
market participants are surprised is to use analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) as a 
proxy for market expectations and compare them with the actual published EPS. Another more 
direct way to determine how investors integrate information into prices is to look at market 
reactions around earnings announcements. Here, we consider both measures and differentiate 
the surprises and market reactions observed around earnings announcements for family and 
non-family firms, as well as for firms with different levels of family control. 
To measure analysts’ forecasts of earnings, we use the mean consensus EPS estimated 
nine months before the release date of annual results. This ensures analysts know the earnings 
from the previous year when making their forecasts. The published EPS is used as the true EPS. 
The estimates are obtained from FactSet. This one-year surprise is standard in the literature and 
has been used by Giroud and Mueller (2011), Edmans (2011), Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi 
(2014), among others. We define earnings surprises in relative terms and normalize the 
difference between realized and expected EPS by the share price at the time of the forecast. For 
a particular firm i and year t, the surprise is:  
 









The market reaction around annual earnings announcements is measured by the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a specific firm and year, computed from an event study 
over the window [-1; +1]. We estimate normal returns with the market model and use the SPI 
as the market portfolio. The parameters of the market model are estimated for a window of 200 
days, 20 days before the announcement date. Table 13 provides the mean values for the earnings 
surprises and market reactions for the entire market, family firms and non-family firms. We 
also compute the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises and CARs. 
 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
Table 13 shows that, for the entire market, the earnings surprise is negative, which 
means that, nine-months ahead, the consensus is above the true EPS and the market is overly 
optimistic regarding future earnings. This is consistent with the literature (see Hovakimian and 
Saenyasiri (2014) for recent international evidence on the earnings forecasts bias). A 
comparison between the mean surprise of family firms and of non-family firms shows that the 
market is more positively surprised by family firms, with an average surprise of -1.31% for 
family firms and -2.34% for other firms. This is also confirmed by the results of the tests of 
differences in means between family firms earnings surprises and those of other firms, all being 
positive and significant. This means that, on average, analysts are less optimistic for family 
firms. For the number of positive and negative surprises for different firms, family firms have 
a larger proportion of positive surprises (0.76) than other firms (0.67). This also means that, 
despite analysts’ tendencies to produce forecasts on average above the realized EPS, realized 
EPS are above the forecasts more frequently for family firms than for other firms. These two 
results indicate the disclosures of annual earnings by family firms surprise the market more 
positively than for other firms. Regarding the way investors react to earnings announcements, 
we find a significant average CAR of 1.16% for family firms, while an insignificant 0.08% is 
obtained for non-family firms. These average CARs are significantly different from each other 
and indicate a strong positive price reaction after family firms announce their earnings. As for 
earnings surprises, the relative frequency of positive CARs is higher for family firms. However, 
the differences in surprises and market reactions might be due to different confounding factors. 
We thus use the approaches of Core et al. (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2011) and estimate 
the following regression: 
 = + + +it i i it i it ity a b X c eZ , (4) 
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where yit is either the earnings surprise or the CAR of firm i in year t, Xit a dummy variable for 
family firms, and Zit a vector of control variables. The set of control variables Zit includes the 
lagged logarithm of the book-to-market ratio and market capitalization at year-end as proposed 
by Core et al. (2006). We also add analyst coverage, since it might impact forecast accuracy 
and market reactions in Switzerland as some firms are followed by a few analysts only. We 
estimate equation (4) using a pooled regression with industry fixed effects. The results are 
presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 14.  
 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 
The regression results confirm those in Table 13, as the dummy for family firms is 
positive and significant for both analysts’ surprises and the CARs arounds earnings 
announcement date. Therefore, it can be concluded that analysts are systematically positively 
surprised by the good performance of family firms and that these firms have a stronger market 
reaction to earnings announcements. These results show that the abnormal returns of family 
firms can be partly explained by annual earnings announcements surprises as the average CAR 
is 1.16% while the annualized abnormal returns for family firms is between 2.8–7.1% 
depending on the risk-adjustment method used.  
As shown in section 5, abnormal returns are associated with the level of family control 
features. We therefore investigate if there is a relation between the family stake and the 
measures of earnings surprise and market reaction. The different descriptive statistics are 
provided for family firms grouped by their level of voting rights and the results are presented 
in Table 15. The surprises are larger for family firms with a stake above 50% than for family 
firms with a moderate stake. In terms of the ratio of positive surprises, family firms with high 
levels of family control have more positive than negative surprises and this ratio is larger than 
for the two other categories of family firms.  
 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
Finally, regarding the market reaction to earnings announcements, family firms with an 
80–100% stake have average CARs of 2.60%, while those of firms with moderate family levels 
of control have average positive CARs of 0.85%. We also observe that the relative frequency 
of positive CARs is higher for family firms with a high control level. The descriptive statistics 
are confirmed by the regression analysis in Table 14. We find significant positive coefficients 
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for the variable of family control rights for surprises and CARs in columns (2) and (5). When 
we decompose the family dummy into three dummy variables representing different levels of 
control by the family in columns (3) and (6), we find positive and significant coefficients for 
the levels of control beyond 50%. The largest estimates are in both cases obtained for family 
firms with more than 80% of voting rights. These results indicate that the market is positively 
surprised by family firms’ performance and this surprise is more significant for family firms 
where the family has the highest levels of control, as the presence of agency problems is more 
likely.  
These results show that the market is regularly and positively surprised by the good 
operational performance of family firms and the absence of agency problems in firms where 
these are presumably more likely to happen. These positive EPS surprises translate into positive 
abnormal returns. However, the magnitude of market reactions found around earnings 
announcements cannot completely explain the abnormal returns in section 5, because they are 
not the sole information events when the market learns about the true performance of family 
firms. Information is also disclosed on other occasions, such as interim results reports or firm-
specific events, that have not been investigated in this paper.  
 
6.3 Interpretation and discussion of the evidence 
Results from the recent literature on ownership structure and returns have identified that 
some specific kind of large owners are associated with positive abnormal returns. Lilienfeld-
Toal and Ruenzi (2014) find that firms that have large CEO ownership have positive abnormal 
returns while Fahlenbrach (2009) show that firms led by a founder-CEO also produce positive 
risk-adjusted returns. While Fahlenbrach (2009) does not find evidence that could rationalize 
the origin of the abnormal performance, Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) discuss different 
possible reasons explaining the abnormal returns they find and attribute their results to the 
positive incentive effects of managerial ownership. A major difference between our study and 
the existing papers is in the level of voting rights held by the shareholders considered. The 
managers in the study of Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) hold on average 26.9% of voting 
rights while the founder-CEOs in Fahlenbrach (2009) have on average 11.9%. In our case, 
founding families control 49.9% of the voting rights on average, which not only gives them 
control over the firm but could also be a level where entrenchment effects could dominate 
incentive effects.15 At level of control above 50%, families are insulated from a large part of the 
                                                          
15 This possibility is mentioned by Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) and has been documented by several authors. 
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pressure from the market. Typically, they cannot be taken over or challenged during proxy 
fights. This means that outside investors have to bear the risk of being exposed to family 
decisions that can have a positive or a negative impact. However, even with a stake larger than 
50%, families might be monitored by another large shareholder and their decisions can be 
challenged. But the highest the stake of the family, the lowest the probability of having another 
large shareholder. Therefore, outside shareholder of firms with high family stakes can bear even 
more risk.  
This can explain the higher returns obtained by firms with a high family stake. Family 
decisions are not necessarily bad and non-value maximizing as can be seen from the higher 
profitability of those firms. However, the market recognizes the risk associated with family 
control by discounting the relative value of those firms. We also find that this discount increases 
with the level of control of the family, which is consistent with the idea that these family firms 
are more risky.  
When family firms disclose their economic results, market participants have the 
possibility to assess whether family control had some detrimental effect on the value of the 
firm. Our results show that the market is systematically positively surprised by the earnings and 
that this leads to adjustment in stock prices that ultimately generate positive abnormal returns. 
Although the level of abnormal returns around earnings announcement is large, it is not 
sufficient to explain entirely the abnormal returns we observe. This is probably due to the fact 
that there are other situations and events where information about the firm is obtained by market 
participants that can then readjust their expectations. The persistence of abnormal returns can 
be explained by the fact that, as long families are at the helm of a firm, agency problems related 
to them are present and might lead to a decrease in value. A family fight, succession problem, 
or non-value maximizing decision might always occur without being challenged. 
It is of interest that similar conclusions regarding the impact of the presence of family 
firms on stock returns have been reached recently by Anderson et al. (2017). Although they 
investigate another issue – the reason behind the valuation discount of dual-class firms in the 
US – they conclude that investors earn a premium for holding shares of firms controlled by 
families. These authors also conclude that it is not the dual-class structure that is driving the 
value discount but the fact that these firms are mostly controlled by families. Our results 
confirm the presence of a valuation discount and positive abnormal returns for family firms in 






Many listed firms are owned and controlled by the founding families worldwide. 
However, the impact of such ownership structures on firm performance is not yet fully 
understood. This study investigates an aspect that has hitherto received limited attention in the 
academic literature by taking the point of view of an investor and analyzing the relationship 
between ownership structure and stock market returns. The lack of academic evidence and 
interest on this issue can be explained by that, in efficient markets, there should be no abnormal 
returns associated with a firm’s ownership structure, since this information is public and should 
be fully integrated in stock prices. However, the results of our empirical investigations on the 
Swiss stock market show different results. We analyze panel data from January 2003 to 
December 2013 for the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss Exchange, 
and find that family firms outperform other firms by 2.8–7.1% per annum. We also find that 
abnormal returns are positively associated with the level of family control. For instance, an 
investment in firms with families controlling between 80% and 100% of the voting rights 
generates an abnormal return of 11.5% per annum. 
We relate our results to the specific agency problems present in family firms. It is well 
established that the main agency problem faced by a listed firm with a controlling shareholder 
is the potential conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders. For family 
firms, agency problems are not likely to materialize as pure wealth expropriation, since family 
wealth might also be negatively affected by such practices. For family firms, agency problems 
might take the form of decisions that maximize the utility of the family but not the value of the 
firm. The goals of these decisions can be firm growth, reputation, or survival. Family firms can 
also suffer from more specific problems such as family feuds or nepotism that have a negative 
impact on firm value. Although these problems are difficult to assess for outside investors, the 
level of family control can give an indication of the magnitude of agency problems. We 
document an inverse relationship between the level of family control and the likelihood of 
having another large shareholder that can eventually challenge family decisions. However, a 
high level of control can also have a positive impact on agency problems, as families have 
stronger incentives to maximize firm performance. We find that family firms are more 
profitable than other firms and that this profitability is related to the level of control, which 
confirms the incentive effect. However, we also find that the market valuation of those firms 
presents a discount, which is deeper for firms with a high level of control. This means that, 
despite their good performance, market participants tend to be pessimistic about the prospects 
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of family firms and especially about those that potentially have more agency problems. A 
complementary analysis of earnings announcements reveals that investors are positively 
surprised by the profits generated by these firms and that these surprises translate into positive 
abnormal returns. We also find that surprises and abnormal returns are larger for firms with a 
higher level of family control. 
The evidence in this paper suggests that market participants have concerns about the 
prospects of family firms because of the presence of potential agency problems. Investors earn 
a premium for holding stocks of those firms and this premium is proportional to the level of 
control of the family, which can be considered to be a proxy for the magnitude of specific 
agency problems of those firms. Our results also have important implications for practitioners 
as they show that investing in the stocks of family firms is profitable but involves exposure to 
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Table 1: Sample composition and evolution over the time 
This table presents the composition of the entire sample, which includes 195 companies for 2003–2013 (19,604 firm-month observations). The table also presents the mean of the main different 
dummy variables related to the ownership structure. The variables are described in the Appendix. A company is considered controlled by a shareholder if he is the largest shareholder and holds 
more than 20% of the voting rights. Column 1 shows the results for the entire period, while columns 2–4 show the composition of the first, middle, and last year, respectively. Columns 5–7 present 
the average number of firms per year for the entire period, as well as the minimum and maximum number of firms. 
 All 2003 2008 2013 Number of firms per year 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Minimum Maximum 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Widely held firms 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.29 49.7 41 55 
Family firms 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.33 52.8 46 60 
Other blockholders 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.38 47.5 40 58 
State 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 7.6 6 9 
Private investor 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.21 21.6 17 30 
Widely held corporation 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 7.6 5 12 
Widely held financial 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 5.8 1 9 
Miscellaneous 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 4.9 3 6 
N 19604 1795 1800 1680 150 140 156 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for different types of controlling shareholders  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the study. A detailed description of the variables is given in the Appendix. Panel A shows the mean, median, maximum, minimum, 
and the standard deviation of monthly stock returns while Panel B presents the mean values of the other variables used in the analysis. The statistics are computed for the entire sample (column 1) and for the 
different types of controlling shareholders, namely family, non-family, widely held, and firms controlled by another blockholder (in columns 2–5, respectively). The table also presents the results of difference 
in means tests and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the variable between the major groups, that is, between family firms and non-family firms (column 6), between family firms and widely held firms (column 
7), and between family firms and other blockholder firms (column 8). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance. 












      Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Stock returns (in %) 
Mean 0.59 0.91 0.41 0.25 0.58 0.49*** 0.65*** 0.32** 
Median 0.60 0.78 0.51 0.67 0.35 0.27*** 0.11** 0.42** 
Minimum -83.09 -57.28 -83.09 -83.09 -73.40    
Maximum 226.93 87.50 226.93 226.93 103.05    
Standard deviation 10.05 8.42 10.83 11.69 9.84    
Panel B: Other variables (means) 
Return-on-assets (in %) 4.19 6.10 3.10 3.39 2.79 3.00*** 2.71*** 3.31*** 
Beta 1.01 0.98 1.03 1.19 0.87 -0.05*** -0.21*** 0.10*** 
Volatility 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 
Wedge 1.22 1.57 1.02 0.98 1.07 0.55*** 0.60*** 0.51*** 
Age (in years) 73.2 69.8 75.1 57.5 93.6 -5.3*** 12.3*** -23.8*** 
Book-to-market 0.82 0.87 0.80 0.65 0.97 0.06*** 0.22*** -0.10*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.61 1.59 1.62 1.78 1.45 -0.03 -0.18*** 0.15** 
Amihud's illiquidity (in ‰) 0.62 0.58 0.65 0.46 0.86 -0.08 0.12* -0.29*** 
Dividend yield (in %) 1.60 1.92 1.42 1.36 1.49 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.43*** 
Leverage 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.16 -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.04*** 
Market value (in million CHF) 5159 4786 5363 9076 1463 -576* -4289*** 3323*** 
Total assets (in million CHF) 3852 3629 3976 6358 1375 -348* -2730*** 2254*** 
Net sales (in million CHF) 3257 3296 3235 5051 1258 61 -1754*** 2039*** 
N 19604 6924 12680 6495 6185 19604 13419 13109 
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Table 3: Results for the firm-characteristics approach  
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time 
and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions (FMB) on a sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to 
December 2013. The dependent variable is a firm’s monthly stock return. The main independent variables are a dummy variable 
for family ownership in columns 1 and 2, and a family dummy variable and a dummy variable indicating that the firm is 
controlled by another blockholder in columns 3 and 4. In all the regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 industry 
classification are included (but not shown). All control variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family dummy 0.0052*** 0.0023* 0.0054*** 0.0024 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
OB dummy   0.0004 0.0008 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Wedge 0.0002 0.0009 0.0001 0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
logBM -0.0058*** -0.0080*** -0.0058** -0.0081*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
logSize 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Price 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 0.0857 -0.0629 0.0859 -0.0669* 
 (0.054) (0.040) (0.054) (0.039) 
Amihud’s illiquidity -1.2218*** -3.6409*** -1.2212*** -3.7627*** 
 (0.390) (1.251) (0.391) (1.236) 
Dividend yield -0.0023** -0.0015*** -0.0023** -0.0015*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.0110 -0.0152** -0.0111 -0.0152** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
Operating margin 0.0000* 0.0002** 0.0000* 0.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales to total assets -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0013 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AG_1year 0.0258*** 0.0215*** 0.0257*** 0.0219*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
AG_5year -0.0204 -0.0156 -0.0204 -0.0169 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) 
SG_1year -0.0001 0.0194*** -0.0001 0.0186*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) 
SG_5year -0.0019 -0.0151 -0.0019 -0.0166 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
Return_2_3 0.0396* -0.0128 0.0396* -0.0147 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) 
Return_4_6 0.0377** 0.0155* 0.0377** 0.0146* 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) 
Return_7_12 -0.0251* -0.0067 -0.0251* -0.0067 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) 
Intercept -0.0117 0.0287** -0.0120 0.0277** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C FMB POLS2C FMB 
N 15546 15546 15546 15546 
R2 0.0291 0.0003 0.0291 0.0003 
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Table 4: Results for the portfolio-based approach  
This table presents the coefficients and robust standard errors of the portfolio-based approach for different portfolios. The 
regressions are based on 132 observations, with data from January 2003 to December 2013. Panel A shows the results for the 
four-factor model of Fama and French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997), which are returns on zero investment portfolios that 
capture the effects of the market (RMRF), size (SMB), book-to-market value (HML), and momentum effect (WML). These 
data for Switzerland are downloaded from Amman’s website (www.manuel-ammann.com). Panel B shows the results for the 
one-factor model, which only includes RMRF. Columns 1–2 show the results of the regression for the portfolios containing 
family firms and non-family firms, whereas column 3 provides results for a portfolio long in family firms and short in non-
family firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
calculated using Huber-White estimators and are shown between parentheses. 







 (1) (2) (3) 
Alpha 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0025* 
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
RMRF 1.1129*** 1.2120*** -0.0991** 
 (0.0487) (0.0438) (0.0459) 
SMB 0.7334*** 0.8867*** -0.1533** 
 (0.0595) (0.0608) (0.0633) 
HML 0.4031*** 0.4393*** -0.0362 
 (0.0762) (0.0664) (0.0770) 
WML 0.0373 0.0442 -0.0069 
 (0.0686) (0.0579) (0.0491) 
N 132 132 132 
R2 0.8719 0.9016 0.0850 
 







 (1) (2) (3) 
Alpha 0.0057** 0.0038 0.0019 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0013) 
RMRF 0.9185*** 0.9782*** -0.0597* 
 (0.0727) (0.0751) (0.0347) 
N 132 132 132 




Table 5: Results of the longevity analysis 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of an equally-weighted portfolio containing all firms in the sample 
(column (1)), as well as portfolios containing family firms and non-family firms (columns 2–3). Each year, monthly abnormal 
returns are calculated for each firm and each month by subtracting the market (SPI) return from the raw return of the stock. 
Starting in January, these benchmark-adjusted returns are cumulated over horizons of x months (12, 24, 36, 48, or 60 months). 
The CARs are then averaged over the number of years and of firms. The table presents also the results of difference in means 
tests for the stock returns between the two groups, that is, between family firms and non-family firms (column 4). In columns 
1–3, the stars indicate if the coefficients are statistically different from 0, whereas in column 4 they indicate the coefficients 
are statistically different from each other. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Month Mean Mean Mean Difference 
1-12 -0.0077 0.0250** -0.0255** 0.0505*** 
     
1-24 -0.0193 0.0508*** -0.0579*** 0.1087*** 
     
1-36 -0.0377* 0.0804*** -0.1042*** 0.1846*** 
     
1-48 -0.0268 0.1332*** -0.1190*** 0.2521*** 
     
1-60 -0.0264 0.1527*** -0.1323*** 0.2850*** 






Table 6: Descriptive statistics on the ownership structure of family firms  
This table presents descriptive statistics on the presence of other large shareholders holding at least 3% of the voting rights in 
family firms. The first row presents the mean level of voting rights of the largest shareholder in a family firm. The second row 
shows the mean level of voting rights of the second largest shareholder. The third and fourth row show the average number of 
large shareholders and their average cumulative stake. The last row shows the proportion of family firms without other 
shareholders holding 3% of voting rights. Column (1) provides the mean values for all family firms while columns (2)-(4) 
contain mean values for family firms with different levels of control.  
 Family firms Family firms  
(Stake 20–50) 
Family firms  
(Stake 50–80) 
Family firms  
(Stake 80–100) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family stake (%) 49.9 31.9 61.9 86.2 
Stake of the second largest 
shareholder (%) 
9.6 9.8 9.5 6.4 
Number of other large 
shareholders 
1.5 2.3 0.9 0.2 
Cumulative stake of other 
large shareholders (%) 
15.4 19.0 11.9 6.4 
Family firm without any 
other large shareholder (%) 
16.7 3.1 25.0 50.0 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for different levels of family control  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the study for the subsample of family firms. A detailed description of the variables is given in the Appendix. Panel A 
shows the mean, median, maximum, minimum, and the standard deviation of monthly stock returns while Panel B presents the mean values of the other variables used in the analysis. The statistics 
are computed for all family firms (column 1) and for different levels of family control, namely 20-50%, 50-80%, 80-100% (in columns 2–4, respectively). The table also presents the results of 
difference in means tests and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the variable between the different groups. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on 
the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance. 
 Family firms Family firms  
(Stake 20–50) 
Family firms  
(Stake 50–80) 
Family firms  
(Stake 80–100) 
(3) – (2) (4) – (2) (4) – (3) 
     Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Stock returns (in %) 
Mean 0.91 0.88 0.91 1.01 0.03 0.13 0.11 
Median 0.78 0.91 0.67 0.56 -0.24 -0.35 -0.11 
Minimum -57.28 -57.28 -40.03 -38.92    
Maximum 87.50 87.50 52.40 26.69    
Standard deviation 8.42 9.53 7.45 8.34    
Panel B: Other variables (means) 
Return-on-assets (in %) 6.10 5.88 6.33 5.81 0.45 -0.07 -0.52 
Beta 0.98 1.16 0.86 0.91 -0.31*** -0.25*** 0.05*** 
Volatility 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 -0.01*** -0.00 0.01*** 
Wedge 1.57 1.30 1.80 1.56 0.50*** 0.26*** -0.24*** 
Age (in years) 69.8 67.8 67.3 95.7 -0.5 27.9*** 28.3*** 
Book-to-market 0.87 0.82 0.72 2.00 -0.09*** 1.19*** 1.28*** 
Tobin’s Q 1.59 1.83 1.53 0.85 -0.30*** -0.98*** -0.68*** 
Amihud's illiquidity (in ‰) 0.58 0.63 0.57 0.35 -0.06 -0.27** -0.21*** 
Dividend yield (in %) 1.92 1.86 1.86 2.58 0.01 0.72*** 0.72*** 
Leverage 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.01*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
Market value (in million CHF) 4786 3263 6658 401 3395*** -2862*** -6257*** 
Total assets (in million CHF) 3629 3622 4095 693 473* -2929*** -3402*** 
Net sales (in million CHF) 3296 3381 3643 662 262 -2720*** -2982*** 
N 6924 2800 3572 552 6372 3352 4124 
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Table 8: Results for the firm-characteristics approach based on family control levels 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions 
(FMB) for the sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the firm’s monthly stock return. In all regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 
industry classification are included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the percentage of voting rights held by the family (Family control rights) in columns 1 and 2, the 
percentage of voting rights held by the family (Family control rights) and the percentage of voting rights held by other blockholders (Other blockholders rights) in columns 3 and 4, the percentage 
of voting rights held by the family (Family control rights) and its square ((Family control rights)2) in columns 5 and 6, and the family dummies according to the three different control levels in 
columns 7 and 8. The control variables are the same as in Table 3 (coefficients not shown). All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family control rights 0.0093*** 0.0058** 0.0090*** 0.0075*** 0.0123 -0.0036   
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)   
Other blockholders rights   -0.0010 0.0064     
   (0.006) (0.005)     
(Family control rights)2     -0.0042 0.0137   
     (0.012) (0.011)   
Family firms (Stake 20–50)       0.0032 -0.0003 
       (0.002) (0.002) 
Family firms (Stake 50–80)       0.0064** 0.0034* 
       (0.003) (0.002) 
Family firms (Stake 80–100)       0.0091*** 0.0098*** 
       (0.003) (0.003) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POL2SC FMB POL2SC FMB POL2SC FMB POL2SC FMB 
N 15546 15546 15546 15546 15546 15546 15546 15546 
R2 0. 0292 0.0003 0. 0292 0.0003 0. 0292 0.0003 0. 0292 0.0003 
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Table 9: Results for the firm-characteristics approach with matching estimators  
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions standard errors clustered at firm level (POLS1C) and Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) regressions (FMB) on a sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to December 2013. The table replicates 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, except that it uses coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. (2009)) to control for causal 
effect. The matching criteria are exact 1-digit ICB industry codes, total assets, and firm age. Panel A presents the results of the 
CEM method that allows using different amounts of treated and control units, whereas Panel B presents the results of the CEM 
method that necessitates using the same number of treated and control units. The dependent variable is a firm’s monthly stock 
return. In all the regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 industry classification are included (but not shown). All 
control variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 Panel A: m-to-n match Panel B: k-to-k match 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family control rights 0.0066* 0.0062** 0.0059* 0.0059* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Wedge -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0018 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
logBM -0.0044** -0.0097*** -0.0053** -0.0124*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
logSize 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0027** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Price 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000*** 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 0.1001** -0.0896* 0.1056** -0.0437 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.046) (0.058) 
Amihud’s illiquidity -1.3623** -4.2206*** -1.8934*** -4.4051 
 (0.538) (1.571) (0.591) (2.866) 
Dividend yield -0.0022** -0.0013** -0.0018 -0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.0024 -0.0120 -0.0060 0.0002 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Operating margin 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales to total assets 0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0025 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
AG_1year 0.0168** 0.0103 0.0138** 0.0056 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) 
AG_5year -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0079 -0.0029 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) 
SG_1year -0.0002 0.0189** 0.0003 0.0134 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.013) 
SG_5year 0.0005 -0.0254** 0.0015 -0.0268* 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.016) 
Return_2_3 0.0449*** -0.0208 0.0344*** -0.0328* 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) 
Return_4_6 0.0359*** 0.0049 0.0407*** 0.0094 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) 
Return_7_12 -0.0245*** -0.0021 -0.0267*** 0.0002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
Intercept -0.0113 0.0239 0.0007 0.0398** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS1C FMB POLS1C FMB 
N 11708 11708 7133 7133 
R2 0.0294 0.4052 0.0333 0.5361 
45 
 
Table 10: Results for the firm-characteristics approach for industry-adjusted returns 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time 
and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions (FMB) on a sample of 195 firms from January 2003 to 
December 2013. The dependent variable is a firm’s monthly stock return adjusted to industry return. In Panel A, industry 
returns are computed using the average return over the industry, whereas in Panel B industry returns are computed using the 
median return over the industry. In all the regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 industry classification are 
included (but not shown). All control variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 Panel A:  
Industry-adjusted returns 
(Average per Industry) 
Panel B: 
Industry-adjusted returns 
(Median per Industry) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family control rights 0.0053* 0.0058** 0.0058** 0.0058** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Wedge 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
logBM -0.0062*** -0.0083*** -0.0064*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
logSize 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Price 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility -0.0285 -0.0635 -0.0231 -0.0635 
 (0.028) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) 
Amihud’s illiquidity -0.5954 -3.7311*** -0.6621 -3.7311*** 
 (0.518) (1.245) (0.441) (1.245) 
Dividend yield -0.0014** -0.0016*** -0.0017** -0.0016*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.0183** -0.0145** -0.0177** -0.0145** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Operating margin 0.0000 0.0002** 0.0000 0.0002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales to total assets -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0014 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AG_1year 0.0174*** 0.0214*** 0.0191*** 0.0214*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
AG_5year -0.0112 -0.0153 -0.0138 -0.0153 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
SG_1year 0.0001 0.0193*** -0.0000 0.0193*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) 
SG_5year 0.0027 -0.0153 0.0033 -0.0153 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) 
Return_2_3 -0.0194** -0.0131 -0.0082 -0.0131 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
Return_4_6 0.0079** 0.0152* 0.0140*** 0.0152* 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) 
Return_7_12 -0.0095*** -0.0065 -0.0113** -0.0065 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Intercept 0.0184 0.0217* 0.0203 0.0221* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C FMB POLS2C FMB 
N 15546 15546 15546 15546 
R2 0.0104 0.0001 0.0115 0.0001 
46 
 
Table 11: Results for the firm-characteristics approach for firms with continuous 
presence over the sample period  
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time 
and firm level (POLS2C) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions (FMB) on a subsample of firms that have observations 
over the whole period of analysis 2003-2013. The dependent variable is a firm’s monthly stock return. In all the regressions, 
industry dummies based on the ICB 10 industry classification are included (but not shown). All control variables are described 
in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between 
parentheses. 
 (1) (2) 
Family control rights 0.0144*** 0.0083*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Wedge -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
logBM -0.0076*** -0.0084*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
logSize 0.0006 -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Price 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 0.0776 -0.0827** 
 (0.053) (0.042) 
Amihud’s illiquidity -1.1118* -4.2419*** 
 (0.606) (1.503) 
Dividend yield -0.0037*** -0.0023*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.0067 -0.0153** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Operating margin 0.0000 0.0002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales to total assets -0.0021 -0.0017 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
AG_1year 0.0216*** 0.0205** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
AG_5year -0.0260 -0.0301** 
 (0.018) (0.015) 
SG_1year 0.0002 0.0211*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) 
SG_5year 0.0035 0.0035 
 (0.005) (0.013) 
Return_2_3 0.0423* -0.0099 
 (0.024) (0.013) 
Return_4_6 0.0328* 0.0092 
 (0.017) (0.009) 
Return_7_12 -0.0276* -0.0006 
 (0.015) (0.007) 
Intercept 0.0001 0.0220* 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C FMB 
N 12904 12904 
R2 0.0322 0.0001 
Table 12: Multivariate regressions results for profitability and valuation ratios 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) for the sample of 195 firms from January 
2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the Return on Assets (ROA) in columns 1–3 and the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q (logTobinQ) in columns 4–9. In all regressions, industry 
dummies based on the ICB 10 industry classification are included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the family dummy in columns 1, 4, and 7, percentage of voting 
rights held by the family in columns 2, 5, and 8, and family dummies according to the three different control levels in columns 3, 6, and 9. All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 ROA logTobinQ logTobinQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Family dummy 1.996**   -0.082   -0.100*   
 (0.876)   (0.060)   (0.056)   
Family control rights  4.034**   -0.216**   -0.254***  
  (1.595)   (0.101)   (0.097)  
Family firms (Stake 20–50)   1.077   -0.039   -0.049 
   (0.926)   (0.075)   (0.067) 
Family firms (Stake 50–80)   2.613**   -0.072   -0.097 
   (1.087)   (0.070)   (0.068) 
Family firms (Stake 80–100)   4.372**   -0.433***   -0.475*** 
   (1.892)   (0.111)   (0.101) 
ROA       0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Wedge 0.115 0.029 -0.076 -0.048 -0.037 -0.038 -0.049 -0.037 -0.038 
 (0.437) (0.410) (0.425) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) 
logSize 1.669*** 1.715*** 1.710*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 
 (0.275) (0.282) (0.280) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
logAge 0.487 0.525 0.524 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.440) (0.444) (0.444) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
Leverage -4.994* -4.668 -4.607 -0.305* -0.329* -0.349** -0.266 -0.291 -0.311* 
 (2.870) (2.896) (2.911) (0.183) (0.185) (0.177) (0.175) (0.178) (0.169) 
SG_1year 3.827** 3.902** 3.886** 0.095** 0.091** 0.088** 0.057 0.052 0.049 
 (1.644) (1.631) (1.638) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Beta -1.721** -1.598** -1.589** -0.095** -0.105** -0.097** -0.077* -0.088** -0.080* 
 (0.807) (0.797) (0.780) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
Investment intensity 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intercept -30.685*** -31.781*** -31.626*** -1.820*** -1.764*** -1.734*** -1.529*** -1.452*** -1.423*** 
 (6.871) (7.082) (6.961) (0.275) (0.277) (0.260) (0.266) (0.267) (0.253) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C 
N 1183 1183 1183 1184 1184 1184 1183 1183 1183 
R2 0.184 0.186 0.187 0.465 0.473 0.480 0.499 0.508 0.516 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for earnings surprises and CARs based on the type of 
controlling shareholders 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings surprises and market reactions to annual earnings announcements 
(CAR). A detailed description of the variables is given in the Appendix. The mean of each variable is presented for the entire 
sample (column 1), as well as for family firms and non-family firms (in columns 2–3, respectively). The table presents also the 
results of differences in means tests for the variables between the two groups (column 4). The table shows the number of 
positive and negative earnings surprises (CAR) and the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises (CAR). To eliminate 
outliers, surprises above 10% of the stock price are not taken into account, as well as those below the 1-percentile and above 
the 99-percentile *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In columns 1–3, the stars 
indicate if the coefficients are statistically different from 0, whereas in column 4 they indicate if the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other based on the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance. 




    Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Surprise (in %) -1.9530*** -1.3055*** -2.3355*** 1.0300*** 
Surprise > 0 494 192 302  
Surprise < 0 707 254 453  
Ratio (+/-) 0.70 0.76 0.67  
N 1201 446 755  
     
CAR (in %) 0.4608*** 1.1577*** 0.0832 1.0745*** 
CAR > 0 837 328 509  
CAR < 0 710 216 494  
Ratio (+/-) 1.18 1.52 1.03  
N 1548 544 1004  
Table 14: Multivariate regression results for earnings surprises and CARs based on family control levels  
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors at time and firm level (POLS2C) for the sample of 195 firms from January 
2003 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the surprise defined in equation (3) in columns 1–3 and the CAR in columns 4–6. In all regressions, industry dummies based on the ICB 10 
industry classification are included (coefficients not shown). The main independent variables are the family dummy in columns 1 and 4, percentage of voting rights held by the family in columns 
2 and 5, and family dummies according to the three different control levels in columns 3 and 6. All variables are described in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are between parentheses. 
 Surprise  CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family dummy 0.6343*   0.7632***   
 (0.348)   (0.292)   
Family control rights  1.6602**   1.6143***  
  (0.788)   (0.541)  
Family firms (Stake 20–50)   -0.0752   0.4642 
   (0.456)   (0.291) 
Family firms (Stake 50–80)   1.0467**   0.8823** 
   (0.524)   (0.368) 
Family firms (Stake 80–100)   2.4914*   2.0539** 
   (1.479)   (0.916) 
Analyst coverage -0.1357** -0.1259** -0.1246** -0.0256 -0.0183 -0.0219 
 (0.065) (0.062) (0.060) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
logSize (lagged) 1.1195*** 1.0777*** 1.0752*** -0.1957 -0.2231 -0.2081 
 (0.350) (0.340) (0.334) (0.254) (0.256) (0.257) 
logBM (lagged) -0.0864 -0.1721 -0.2042 0.1065 0.0487 0.0512 
 (0.666) (0.690) (0.702) (0.256) (0.251) (0.244) 
Intercept -24.8477*** -24.5598*** -24.5786*** 5.0043** 5.1641** 5.0609** 
 (4.907) (4.867) (4.878) (2.006) (2.037) (2.148) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C POLS2C 
N 1182 1182 1182 1201 1201 1201 





Table 15: Descriptive statistics for earnings surprises and CARs based on family control levels 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings surprises and market reactions to annual earnings announcements (CAR). A detailed description of the variable is given in the Appendix. 
The mean of each variable is presented for the entire subsample of family firms (column 1), as well as for the three family control levels (columns 2–4). The table also presents the results of 
differences in means tests for the variables between the different subcategories, that is, between family firms with medium and low stakes (column 5), with high and low stakes (column 6), with 
high and medium stakes (column 7). The table also shows the number of positive and negative earnings surprises (CAR) and the ratio of positive to negative earnings surprises (CAR). To eliminate 
outliers, surprises above 10% of the stock price are not taken into account, as well as those below the 1-percentile and above the 99-percentile. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. In columns 1–4, the stars indicate the coefficients are statistically different from 0 whereas, in columns 5–7, they indicate if the coefficients are statistically different 
from each other based on the t-statistic and assuming unequal variance.  
 Family firms Family firms  
(Stake 20–50) 
Family firms  
(Stake 50–80) 
Family firms  
(Stake 80–100) 
(3) - (2) (4) - (2) (4) - (3) 
     Difference Difference Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Surprise (in %) -1.3055*** -2.0556*** -0.7432** -0.7479 1.3123** 1.3077 -0.0047 
Surprise > 0 192 77 101 14    
Surprise < 0 254 114 128 12    
Ratio (+/-) 0.76 0.68 0.79 1.17    
N 446 191 229 26    
        
CAR (in %) 1.1577*** 0.8521*** 1.2176*** 2.6047*** 0.3655 1.7526* 1.3871 
CAR > 0 328 134 170 24    
CAR < 0 216 88 117 11    
CAR (+/-) 1.52 1.52 1.45 2.18    






Appendix: Variable definitions and sources 
This table defines the variables used in the analysis. The data for the ownership structure are obtained from the database of 
Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) and updated by hand-collecting data from annual reports and from the Swiss stock guides. Firm 
characteristics and market data are mainly from Datastream and Worldscope, while those on earnings announcements are from 
FactSet. The period of analysis is from January 2003 to December 2013. 
Firm ownership measure 
Widely held firm (WH) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if no shareholder holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (FF) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a family holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family control rights The percentage of voting rights held by the largest shareholder in a family firm. 
Family firms (Stake 20–50) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family holds between 20% and 50% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (Stake 50–80) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family holds between 50% and 80% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Family firms (Stake 80–
100) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family holds between 80% and 
100% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Other blockholder (OB) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has a shareholder with more than 20% of the voting rights but is not family, and 0 otherwise. 
State (S) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the state holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Private investor (PI) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a private investor holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Widely held corporation 
(WHC) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if another widely held corporation 
holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Widely held financial 
(WHF) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if another widely held financial firm 
holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Miscellaneous (Misc) Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an unclassifiable shareholder holds more than 20% of the voting rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm characteristics 
Age The age of a firm in years computed as the current year minus the year of foundation stated in the Swiss stock guides. 
Amihud's illiquidity ratio 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)) is calculated using daily 
data and is then averaged by month. The daily ratio is calculated by dividing 
the daily return by the daily trading volume, which is calculated by 
multiplying the daily price by the daily volume. Data are obtained from 
Datastream. 
Asset growth (AG) The asset growth of a firm over the past year and the past five years (AG_1year, AG_5years). Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Beta Regression coefficients of the market model calculated using the returns of the previous 60 months. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Book-to-market (BM) Ratio of the book value to the market value of common equity. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Dividend yield (DY) The ratio of total dividends to total market capitalization. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
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Investment intensity The ratio of capital expenditure to Property, Plant, & Equipment (PP&E) of the previous year. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Leverage (Lev) Long-term debt divided by total assets. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
logAge The natural logarithm of the age. Data are obtained from the Swiss stock guides. 
logBM The natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
logSize The natural logarithm of the firm’s market value. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
logTobinQ The natural logarithm of the Tobin’s Q. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Market value Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. Data are obtained from Datastream and expressed in million CHF. 
Net sales 
Gross sales and other operating revenue except discounts, returns, and 
allowances. Data are obtained from Worldscope and expressed in million 
CHF. 
Operating margin (OM) Operating income over net sales. Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Price The closing price at which the firm’s stock is traded. Data are obtained from Datastream and expressed in CHF. 
Return_2_3 The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns over months t - 2 and t - 3. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Return_4_6 The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns from month t - 6 to t - 4. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Return_7_12 The natural logarithm of the cumulative returns from month t - 12 to t - 7. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Return-on-assets (ROA) Income before extraordinary items (IBEI) divided by the total assets. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Return-on-equity (ROE) Net income divided by the book value on equity. Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Sales growth The sales growth of a firm over the past year and the past five years (SG_1year, SG_5years). Data are obtained from Worldscope. 
Sales to total assets Net sales divided by total assets. Data are obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. 
Tobin’s Q The sum of the market value and total assets minus the book value divided by the total assets. Data are obtained from Datastream. 
Total assets 
Sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment, and other assets. Data are obtained from Datastream and 
expressed in million CHF. 
Volatility The monthly volatility of a stock calculated using daily data and averaged by month. Data are obtained from Datastream. 





Analyst coverage The number of analysts issuing nine-month horizon earnings per share estimates for a particular firm and year. Data are obtained from FactSet. 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) 
The CAR is computed from an event study (with the market model as normal 
return) over the window [-1; +1]. Data are obtained from Datastream and 
FactSet. 
Surprise 
The actual earnings per share at the end of the fiscal year minus the estimated 
earnings forecasted nine months prior, deflated by the share price at the time 




Monthly returns of the securities calculated from the monthly stock prices 
collected at the end of each month and adjusted to the dividend distribution. 
Data are obtained from Datastream. 
RFt 
The risk-free rate in month t is the three-month ICE Libor for CHF. Data 
are obtained from Datastream. 
RMRFt 
The expected market return minus the risk-free rate (RF) in month t. Data 
are obtained from Ammann and Steiner (2008) website. 
SMBt 
The difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio of 
small-cap stocks and that of a portfolio of large cap stocks. Data are 
obtained from Ammann and Steiner (2008) website. 
HMLt 
The difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio of 
stocks with high book-to-market and that of a portfolio of stocks with low 
book-to-market. Data are obtained from Ammann and Steiner (2008) 
website. 
WMLt 
The difference between the expected return in month t of a portfolio with 
stocks having outperformed the previous month and that of a portfolio with 
stocks having underperformed in the previous month. Data are obtained 
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